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NOTES AND COMMENTS
process.180 Some jurisdictions have emphasized the citizen's right to
protection while others have given a free rein to the State to appeal
criminal cases.' 31 Many jurisdictions have derogated the common
law and have allowed some appeal by the State.'32 Just where that
appellate power should cease has been another question.
Perhaps the best approach to the problem is to allow appeals by
the State on all questions of law. 3 3 The law is the basis of our
society. It should contemplate its own best interest by providing
appeals which would help to clarify and protect it. If questions of
law are neglected when it could be to no one's harm to have them
answered, society as a whole is put at a disadvantage. Not only may
guilty individuals escape punishment but the citizenry must ride a
crest of consequential errors promulgated in the court system.
Appeals by the State on questions of law would by definition
exclude appeals from general verdicts. It would eliminate the
necessity for distinctions between special verdicts, demurrers, con-
stitutional questions and quashals. The courts could deal with legal
problems and avoid the formal distinctions. Such a practice would
pay dividends in efficient appellate procedure, definitive answers to
legal questions, and swifter and surer justice for all.
ARNOLD T. WooD
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual-Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court of the United States recently denied certio-
rari to consider whether the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment1 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on a convicted rapist.2 However, Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented and favored granting
.. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
... Ibid. Various states have adopted differing approaches between the
extremes of no appellate power in the State and unlimited appellate power.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958), allowing appeals by
the State only when statutes are declared unconstitutional.
.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-96 (1958) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
... Our own court has questioned such an omission from N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-179. See State v. Todd, 224 N.C. 776, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).
'"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.' Rudolph v. Alabama, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3154 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1963).
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certiorari to consider whether capital punishment for rape was (1)
violative of the evolving standard of decency that marks the progress
of society, (2) punishment disproportionate to the offense, (3) un-
necessary cruelty since the aims of punishment may be achieved by
a less severe penalty than death.' The dissenting opinion supported
its reasons for raising these questions on various surveys and figures
showing the decline and ineffectiveness of the death penalty as punish-
ment for rape. The importance of the dissent lies in the possibility
that the Supreme Court might take judicial notice of such criteria
and consider the question of whether the death penalty, in light of
such notice, might be considered cruel and unusual punishment, not
merely for rape, but for all crime.
The latent ambiguities in the term "cruel and unusual" have made
it difficult for the courts to define its exact meaning.4 The clause
originated in the Magna CartaP and was included in the English
Bill of Rights of 16888 as a result of the atrocious conduct of the
Stuarts. It worked its way through several of the early American
state constitutions into the Federal Bill of Rights adopted in 1791.8
The early cases interpreted the sanction against cruel and unusual
punishment as placing a fixed standard on the inhuman methods
of punishment, prohibiting only those physical brutalities and
tortures which existed when it was adopted, such as burnings,
brandings, and disembowelings.9 However, in 1909 the Court in
8 Ibid.
"'Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent
of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted." Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36
(1878).
'9 Hen. 3, c.14 (1225).
81 W. & M., c.2, I, § 10 (1689).
" "[Cruel and unusual punishment] .., is usually applied to punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the ironboot, the
stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and
suffering. Such punishments were at one time inflicted in England, but
they were rendered impossible by the Declaration of Rights, adopted by
Parliament on the successful termination of the revolution of IT88, and
subsequently confirmed in the Bill of Rights of 1688." O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (dissenting opinion). See Notes, 41 N.C.L. REv.
244, 245 (1963); 4 VAND. L. REv. 680, 682 (1951).
'BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 16 (1964). [Hereinafter
cited as BEDAU.]
'O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 324 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). See also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1909) (dissenting opinion). This early view
restricted the legislature from prescribing inhuman methods of punishment
[Vol. 42
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Weems v. United States" rejected the contention that the framers
intended merely "to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went
out of practice with the Stuarts" and stated that "the clause of the
Constitution ... is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice."" Thus the concept of cruel and unusual is no longer a static
restriction against early English barbarities in the modes of punish-
ment, but rather increases in its meaning as the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' 2 increase.
This reinterpretation has expanded the eighth amendment in mean-
ing, scope and application.'
Although reluctant at first,'4 the Court seems to have definitely
decided that the eighth amendment is incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment by the due process clause and is applicable to the
states. 5 While the Court recognizes the power of the legislature to
prescribe the severity of punishment,'" it has declared that a punish-
but gave them full power to define the severity of punishment. See Note, 36
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 846, 847 (1961)." 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
11 Id. at 373. Justice McKenna went on further to state that "legislation,
both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience
of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily con-
fined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words
of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it."' Ibid.
12Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
See Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961).
"The early decisions stated that the eighth amendment was only a
limitation on the federal government and did not apply to the states. It re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 324 (1892).
However, confusion began in Louisiana ex ret. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), when the Court assumed but did not decide that the eighth
amendment applied to the states. It continued in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d
250 (3rd. Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949),
leading one distinguished writer to the conclusion that, "while a categorical
statement that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment by a state has yet to be made by the Supreme Court, any judg-
ment to the contrary would be so shocking that its possibility appears
negligible." Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1950).
' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
'o "We disclaim the right to assert a judgment against that of the legisla-
ture of the expediency of the laws or the rights to oppose the judicial power
to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their punishment, unless that
power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In such a case
19641
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ment disproportionate to the offense may be cruel and unusual in the
same manner as inhuman methods of punishment."Y Cruel and un-
usual punishment is no longer limited merely to physical cruelties but
includes mental cruelty as well.' s When the purpose of a statute is
deemed to place a cruel punishment on those who violate it, the
Court may declare it unconstitutional.' 9 Thus it can readily be
seen that expansion of the definition of the eighth amendment has
broadened the area in which the judiciary can limit the legislature's
power to inflict punishment. When a punishment violates the
standard set by society, it is the duty of the court to declare it un-
constitutional."0 However, in order for the court to apply such an
elusive test as the evolving standards of decency that mark a civilized
society, judicial notice must be taken of the facts which are indica-
tive of a punishment's acceptance and necessity in that society. The
question arises whether the death penalty can now survive, or
whether society has evolved to that stage in civilization where it is
cruel and unusual.
The history of the death penalty found its origin in the Biblical
admonition that "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
blood be shed."'" However, as time went on, capital punishment
failed to be so restricted. Between the fifteenth and nineteenth
centuries in England, the crimes punishable by death increased from
fifty to two hundred and thirty-three, which included "crimes of
every description against the state, against the person, against
property, [and] against the public peace.... "22  The earliest codifi-
cation of capital crimes in the United States, "The Capitall Laws of
New England," was enacted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
not our discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its
-direction, is invoked." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1909).
"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909) (hard and painful labor
as punishment for falsifying public documents). In reaching his decision
Justice McKenna urged that a less severe punishment would suffice since
"the state suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment
is fullfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting severity,
its repetition is prevented and hope is given for the reformation of the
criminal." Id. at 381.
18 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). In declaring that denationaliza-
tion was cruel and unusual, Chief Justice Warren took judicial notice of the
fact that the civilized nations of the world were in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. Id. at 102-03.
"o Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (concurring opinion





1636 and listed thirteen offenses punishable by death. 3 Although
the use of capital punishment in the United States today has pro-
gressed over that of nineteenth century England, the effect of such
progress has been more evident in the methods used in administering
the death penalty than in the number of crimes punishable by it.24
However, the decline of the death penalty in the United States
cannot be recognized by reviewing the number of statutes that pre-
scribe it,25 or the number of jurisdictions that retain it.28 It is more
significant to note that in the actual disposition of capital cases, the
number of persons executed has been dropping steadily, while the
number of persons awaiting execution has been increasing. Where-
as the number of persons executed in England between 1805 and 1812
was two to three thousand,27 the number executed in the United
States between 1955 and 1962 was approximately four hundred and
fifty.2 s During the past decade, it is estimated that only, one out of
every ten persons convicted of first degree murder was executed.29
" Id. at 5. Among those included were: idolatry, W'itchcraft, blasphemy,
sodomy, buggery, adultry, and manstealing.
" "Probably few Americans have any idea just how many crimes still
carry a death penalty-anywhere from thirty-three to sixty-seven, de-
pending on how they are classified and counted. They range from the
familiar ones such as murder, kidnapping, rape, and treason, to such crimes
as desecrating a grave '(Georgia), attempting to set fire to a prison (Ar-
kansas), and sexual intercourse with a girl under eighteen, so called 'statutory
rape' (Nevada and Texas)." Id. at 32-33. There are four crimes punish-
able by death in North Carolina: arson, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953) ;
burglary, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1953); murder, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1953); rape, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
" "According to the National Prison Statistics there are only seven
capital crimes for which the death sentence has been carried out since 1930:
murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, espionage, burglary, and assault
by a life term prisoner. Thus, when one speaks about the volume of capital
crimes in the United States, one refers for all practices to the volume of
these seven crimes." BEDAU 57.
"6 The United States is made up of fifty-four jurisdictions-the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
federal government under both civil and military law. Of these fifty-four
jurisdictions, only six have totally abolished capital punishment-Alaska,
Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin. Three other states
have abolished it for all but certain crimes: Michigan (treason); Rhode
Island (murder by a life term convict); North Dakota (murder by a life
term convict serving a life term for murder). Ten states have abolished
the death penalty and then restored it. See BEDAU 12.2 7 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 110-11. Since 1909 in North Carolina, there have been 275
executions for murder, 68 for rape, 11 for burglary, and 1 for arson-murder.
Letter from the North Carolina Parole Board, to Floyd McKissick, February
10, 1964, on file in the North Carolina Law Library.
20 BEDAu 36.
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In 1962, out of three hundred and seventy-two people sentenced to
death, forty-seven were executed, fifty-eight were disposed of by
other means,30 and two hundred and sixty-seven were awaiting
execution at the year's end." This reluctance of the courts to carry
out the death penalty leads one to the conclusion that capital punish-
ment in the United States today is "an anachronism, a vestigial sur-
vivor of an earlier era when the possibilities of an incarcerative and
rehabilitative penology were hardly imagined."
3 2
However, the judiciary does not seem to hold as high a regard
for human life in construing cruel and unusual punishment, as it does
in actually disposing of the death penalty. Thus far, cruel and
unusual "implies that there be something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 3  The
Supreme Court has made the distinction that "punishments are cruel
when they involve torture, or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the Constitution."3 " According to this view, while death itself is
not cruel and unusual, the methods of inflicting it may be, if they
add unnecessary pain. 5 Thus, burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking at the wheel, or the like are cruel and unusual methods,"0
while hanging,3 7 electrocutionu lethal gas, 9 and shooting4 0 are
humane and progressive means to administer death. Other cases
offer the suggestion that as all punishment is in a sense cruel, the
cruelty inherent in the death penalty is sanctioned by the Constitu-
"oTwenty-seven received commutations, 4 were transported to a mental
hospital, while the other 27 received either reversals of judgments, vacated
sentences or grants for new trials. Id. at 108.
'311d. at 106.
32 Id. at 31.8 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
* Ibid.
It re Storti, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901).
"In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
", State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628, 190 N.W. 38 (1922) ; Dutton v. State,
123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914).
"In re Storti, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901); State v. Tomasi, 75
N.J.L. 739, 69 AtI. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908) ; People ex rel. Kemmler v.
Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. 6, application for writ of error denied sub
torn., in re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131
Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582 (1921).
"Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934); People v.
Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953);
State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676 (1923).
"Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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tion since it is necessary for the protection of society.4" Although
it is conceded that the death penalty could be disproportionate to
the offense, the courts have failed to strike down capital statutes for
lower felonies,42 and in one case for a misdemeanor,4 3 usually under
the logic that such statutes do not shock the conscience of the com-
munity.44 Except for a recent dictum to the contrary,45 it is obvious
that the death penalty has been held constitutional under a narrow
and static interpretation of the eighth amendment. By applying the
"lingering death" rule, the courts are foreclosing the possibility that
death, as a mode of punishment, might become cruel and unusual,4
which in itself is contradictory to the evolving standard test accepted
by the contemporary judiciary. If the standards of society have
changed so that the death penalty is no longer acceptable to its ideas
of decency, then it seems capital punishment ought to be struck
down by judicial action.
Since the Supreme Court must view cruel and unusual punish-
ment in the light of an evolving standard, it is necessary for it to
take judicial notice of data relevant in determining that standard. 7
"Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914); State v. Tomasi,
75 N.J.L. 739, 69 Ati. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908)."2 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952) (conspiring to
espionage); Ex parte Wells, 35 Cal. 2d 889, 221 P.2d 947 (1950) (assault
by a person serving a life term); People v. Tanner, 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d
324 (1935) (kidnapping); People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 106 Pac.
74 (1910) (assault with a deadly weapon by a person serving a life term);
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748, 265 S.W. 339 (1924) (burglary);
Walker v. State, 186 Md. 440, 47 A.2d 47 (1946) (attempted rape); Territory
v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 Pac. 169 (1901) (assault upon a train with
intent to commit robbery); Ellis v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 295, 19 P.2d 972
(1933) (robbery with firearms); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109
S.E. 582 (1921) (attempted rape).
' Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914) (assault with intent
to commit rape).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
""Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on
moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment
-and they are forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout
our history and in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to
violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 99 (1957).
"'In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the
court followed the lingering death test and held that re-executing a man
after an electrical power failure in the first execution did not subject him
either to a lingering death or to unnecessary cruelty.
", The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of such data in declaring
other punishments cruel and unusual. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (punishment imposed for being a dope addict); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1957) (denationalization).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Recent surveys conducted at home and abroad seem to reject the
contention that the death penalty is still "widely accepted"4 8 and
warrant the Supreme Court's recognition. Although many foreign
countries retain capital punishment, a very substantial number of
civilized countries have abolished it.49 Surveys of the United States
tend to question the acceptance of death as a punishment. Accord-
ing to one estimate there was a seventeen per cent decline between
1953-1960 in the number of people favoring the death penalty for
the crime of murder.8 0 More specialized interviews with prison
wardens 1 and policemen52 demonstrate divided opinions on the
efficacy of capital punishment. As already mentioned, the declining
number of executions per year compared with the increasing volume
of capital offenses53 indicates the judiciary's disfavor with the death
penalty. There is also authority that a severe penalty can come
within the eighth amendment prohibition against unnecessary cruelty
if the purposes of punishment-rehabilitation, isolation, and deter-
rence--can be achieved by a less severe punishment. 4 Undoubtedly,
"See note 45 supra.
""The death penalty is found in Australia, except in Queensland; in
Africa; and in Asia, except in Israel, Ceylon (temporary moratorium),
and the Indian provinces of Travancore and Nepal. It is in Europe and
the Americas that the cleavage of opinion is found. The countries of Eastern
Europe and the Balkans have retained it, but in Western 2urope it has been
abolished in all nations except in Spain, France, the United Kingdom and
the Irish Republic. In Latin America, it has been abolished in Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, and Mexico (federal law and all but eight of the states).
In North America, Canada has retained it." SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY,
A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE 1 (1959).
coBEDAU 240.
"In one survey, 89% of the wardens interviewed did not regard capital
punishment as deterrent to murder. Thomas, Attitudes of Wardens Toward
the Death Penalty, in BEDAU 244.
", Campion, Attitudes of State Police toward the Death Penalty, in id. at
252.
" A comparison of the volume of crimes with the number of executions
for that crime in 1962 shows that there were 8,400 murders and only 41
executions; 16,310 rapes and only 4 executions; 139,600 assaults, 95,260 rob-
beries, 892,800 burglaries with only 2 executions for crimes other than
murder or rape. See BEDAU 65, Table 1; 110-11. In North Carolina there
were 5,786 convictions for burglary in Superior Court between 1960-61.
[1960-1962] N.C. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL RE'. 214-15. Yet since 1909, there
have only been 11 executions for burglary. Letter from the North Carolina
Parole Board to Floyd McKissick, February 10, 1964, on file in the North
Carolina Law Library.
" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (concurring opinion
of Douglas); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1957) (concurring opinion
of Black and Douglas); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
[Vol. 42
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the deterrent factor is the basic purpose in retaining the death
penalty.55 Thus, if capital punishment does not in fact deter, it
could be unnecessarily cruel. Yet, the death penalty remains un-
questioned by the Supreme Court in spite of exhaustive studies by
sociologists and criminologists which led one of them to the con-
clusion: "[T]he death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence
on the extent or fluctuating rates of capital crimes. It has failed
as a deterrent."56  Comparisons made of those states that have
abolished the death penalty and those that retain it, refute the con-
tentions that homicide rates increase without the death penalty,5"
that capital punishment is necessary for the protection of the police, 3
or that' executions actually serve as a deterrent to future crimes. 9
Thus, such surveys and statistics illustrate that there is a doubt
whether capital punishment per se is acceptable or necessary in
present-day society; however, it should also be noted that these
surveys are, for the most part, directed toward the total abolition of
capital punishment, leaving the constitutionality of death as a punish-
ment for rape, burglary, and arson in even more uncertainty.
As the eighth amendment derives its meaning from the changing
standards of society, the death penalty can not be condoned under
a standard set by ancient penal theories. If capital punishment for
various, if not all crimes, is constitutional, the courts must consider
it according to contemporary society, and ratify it in view of the
standards of contemporary society. It is hoped that Justice Gold-
berg's dissent in the principal case indicates that, in future capital
cases the Supreme Court will apply the evolving standards test and
take judicial notice of those facts illustrative of a changed society.
JOSEPH DONALD WALSH, JR.
" Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Aft. 417 (1914) ; State v. Tomasi, 75
N.J.L. 739, 69 Atl. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908); People ex rel. Kemmler
v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. 6 (1890).
Sellin, Death and Imprisonment as Deterrents to Murder, in BEDAu 284.
Id. at 274.
'8 A 1950 survey of 82 cities in states abolishing capital punishment, with
a population total of 2,804,757, and 182 cities in states that have retained it
with a population total of 7,147,216, showed that the rate per 100,000 of fatal
attacks on the police was 1.2 for the abolition cities and 1.3 for the reten-
tionist cities. Sellin, Does the Death Penalty Protect the Municipal Police,
in BEDAU 291-92.
" Savitz, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in Philadalphia, in
id. at 315; Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California,
in id. at 322.
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